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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model in which a rm exercises an option to expand production
on either a small or large scale with cash reserves and costly external funds. We show that
the nancing costs greatly distort the rm's nancing and investment behavior and result
in a policy contingent on the dynamics of the cash ow and reserves. Most notably, we
prove that an intermediate level of cash reserves is likely to accelerate investment in the
small-scale project by interactions among nancing costs, investment timing, and invest-
ment sizing. Our results ll the gap between two types of results: (i) empirical ndings in
a U-shaped relation between the investment volume and internal funds, and (ii) empirical
predictions of a U-shaped relation between the investment timing and internal funds.
JEL Classications Code: G13; G31; G32.
Keywords: Investment timing; Investment size; Costly external nancing; Optimal stop-
ping.
This version: 12 April, 2012.
yCorresponding Author. Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka,
Osaka 560-0043, Japan, E-mail: nishihara@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp, Phone: 81-6-6850-5242, Fax: 81-6-6850-5277
zGraduate School of Social Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1-1 Minami-Osawa, Hachioji, Tokyo
192-0397, Japan, E-mail: tshibata@tmu.ac.jp, Phone: 81-42-677-2310, Fax: 81-42-677-2298
1
1 Introduction
Subsequent to the departures from Modigliani and Miller (1958)'s irrelevance proposition
in a frictionless market, there has been a long tradition in corporate nance to inves-
tigate the eects of various frictions on nancing and investment decisions. Recently,
an increasing number of papers have analyzed not only the static but also the dynamic
behaviors of corporate nancing and investment in the presence of frictions.1 Among
these, a real options approach plays an important role in unveiling investment timing
decisions in the presence of such frictions as liquidity constraints (Boyle and Guthrie
(2003)), shareholders-debtholders conicts (Mauer and Sarkar (2005), Sundaresan and
Wang (2007)), and asymmetric information (Grenadier and Wang (2005), Shibata and
Nishihara (2010) Morellec and Schurho (2011), and Grenadier and Malenko (2011)).
We extend this line of research by revealing the interactions of costs of external -
nancing, investment timing, and investment size. The model is as follows: A rm owns
an option to expand production on either a small or large scale, where the price of the
output follows a geometric Brownian motion. The investment project is nanced with
cash reserves and costly external funds. The rm's cash reserves gradually increase as the
rm's existent production generates cash ows. If the rm waits for a sucient level of
cash reserves for each project, the investment project can be nanced entirely with cash
reserves. Otherwise, the rm must rely partially on costly external nancing. For the
small-scale expansion, the sucient cash level is lower than that of for the large-scale ex-
pansion. Considering the trade-o, the rm determines its nancing, investment timing,
and investment sizing policy.
As in the standard real options literature (e.g., McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)), our model assumes the irreversibility of investing as a friction. A key
dierence from most of the related papers is that we incorporate the investment sizing
decision in addition to the investment timing decision. The assumption of either a small-
or large-scale choice builds on Dixit (1993) and Decamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006).
Indeed, our model generalizes their models to a case with costs of external nancing. The
nancing costs are known as one of the most inuential frictions in the corporate nance
literature (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), Hennessy and Whited (2007)). According to
the pecking order hypothesis, asymmetric information problems associated with external
funding generate higher costs; therefore, managers prefer internal over external nancing
(Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984)). As a proportional cost accounts for the largest
part of external nancing costs, we focus primarily on the case with a proportional cost.
Before describing the results, we emphasize a contribution of this paper from the
theoretical viewpoint. Most of the related papers demonstrate their results only by nu-
merical examples because the model's complexity precludes analytic results (e.g., Boyle
1An incomplete list includes Hennessy and Whited (2005), Hennessy and Whited (2007), Hennessy, Levy,
and Whited (2007), Tsyplakov (2008), Tserlukevich (2008), and Morellec and Schurho (2011).
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and Guthrie (2003), Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010a), Shibata and Nishihara (2012)).
Contrasted to the stream of literature, this paper analytically proves the interesting prop-
erties of the dynamic corporate nancing and investment policy by developing techniques
in the mathematical nance literature (e.g., Broadie and Detemple (1997), Detemple
(2006), Bobtche and Villeneuve (2010)) into a case involving a non-convex payo and a
non-geometric Brownian motion.
The results are summarized as follows. The presence of nancing costs, unlike previous
results with no nancing cost in Decamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006), leads the rm
to take a nancing and investment policy contingent not only on the cash ow dynamics
but also on the cash reserves dynamics. Specically, higher nancing costs enhance the
rm's incentive to wait for a sucient level of cash reserves and use entirely internal
nancing, especially for the small-scale project.
The investment threshold for the large-scale project monotonically decreases with cash
reserves. This monotonic relation is straightforwardly consistent with conventional views
of underinvestment due to nancing constraints. On the other hand, the investment re-
gion for the small-scale project is not monotonic with cash reserves. The small-scale
investment is encouraged with cash reserves until cash reserves reach the investment cost
and, after that, the investment is discouraged with cash reserves. The rationale behind
the non-monotonic relation is that the rm optimizes not only investment timing but also
investment size. Consider the ratio of the total cost associated with the large-scale expan-
sion to that of the small-scale expansion. The ratio, which changes with cash reserves, is
maximized when cash reserves are equal to the amount of the small-scale investment cost.
Indeed, at that moment the small-scale project requires no external funds while the large-
scale project requires a great amount of external funds. The greatest advantage of the
small-scale project over the large-scale project plays a role in speeding up the small-scale
investment at the intermediate level of cash reserves.
Most notably, our results can link two signicant results in corporate nance. The
rst one is a U-shaped relation between the investment volume and internal funds. Since
arguments among Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
and Hubbard (1998), investment-cash ow sensitivities have been the center of attention in
corporate nance. In particular, recent empirical evidence regarding this issue documented
that the investment volume does not necessarily decrease with internal funds but can
have a U-shaped relation with internal funds (Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007), Guariglia
(2008)).
The second result is an empirical prediction that the investment threshold has a U-
shaped relation with a degree of nancial constraints. The prediction has been seen in the
recent real option literature. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) examined the eects of a liquidity
constraint to the investment timing decision and predicted that the investment threshold
has a U-shaped relation with a degree of the liquidity constraint. Shibata and Nishihara
(2012), who examined the eects of a debt capacity constraint in a dynamic nancing and
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capital structure model, showed that the investment threshold has a U-shaped relation
with a degree of the debt capacity constraint.2
If one identies \earlier" investment as \increased" investment, the two results are
inconsistent with each other. However, this argument pays no attention to the point that
the investment timing studies consider xed-scale investment models. Our results can
explain both types of results in terms of the interactions of investment timing and sizing
decisions with costly external nancing. In the presence of nancing costs, cash reserves
inuence the trade-o between the two choices: small- or large-scale expansion. When
cash reserves are close to the amount of the small-scale investment cost, the rm has
a great incentive to invest in the small-scale project for which the investment threshold
is relatively low. When cash reserves are much higher or lower than that level, the
rm is likely to undertake the large-scale expansion for which the investment threshold
is relatively high. This mechanism can explain U-shaped relations regarding both the
investment volume and timing in the previous studies.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are threefold. First and most im-
portantly, this paper lls the gap between two types of results in the corporate nance
literature: (i) empirical evidence regarding a U-shaped relation between the investment
volume and internal funds and (ii) predictions of a U-shaped relation between the invest-
ment timing and internal funds. Second, this paper complements the investment timing
and sizing literature by proving that costs of external nancing greatly distort the deci-
sion, leading especially to a policy dependent the dynamics of both cash ow and cash
reserves. Third, this paper contributes the mathematical nance literature by proving
the properties of exercise regions of an optimal stopping problem involving a non-convex
payo function and a non-geometric Brownian motion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup
and the results in the case without nancing costs. Section 3 presents the results in the
case with a proportional cost and explains empirical implications. Section 4 examines
the comparative statics with respect to the price volatility and a case with xed and
proportional costs in numerical examples. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs
appear in the appendix.
2Regarding the relation between the investment timing and cash holdings, Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010b),
who extended Boyle and Guthrie (2003) to a case with nancing costs, pointed out the possibility of various
non-monotonic relations, and Nishihara and Shibata (2011) proved that a xed cost of external nancing leads
to a non-monotonic relation.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Setup
Consider a risk-neutral rm that produces a commodity at a constant rate. The output
is sold at the market price X(t), which follows a geometric Brownian motion
dX(t) = X(t)dt+ X(t)dB(t) (t > 0); X(0) = x; (1)
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion dened in a probability space (
;F ;P)
and ; (> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. For convergence, we assume that r > , where r
is a positive and constant interest rate. Assume that the rm owns an option to expand
production on either a small or large scale, A1(> 1) or A2(> A1), respectively, at any
time. If the small-scale (large-scale) growth option is exercised at time  , the rm pays a
xed investment cost at time  and receives an instantaneous cash ow A1X(t) (A2X(t))
after time  . Assume that the investment cost is I1(> 0) (I2(> I1)) for the small-scale
(large-scale) expansion if the whole amount of the cost is internally nanced. If part
of the investment cost is externally nanced, the rm pays a proportional cost C(
0) of external nancing. The total cost associated with the investment is expressed as
Ii+Cmax(Ii  Y (); 0) (i = 1; 2), where Y () denotes the rm's cash reserves at time  .
Until the investment time  , cash reserves Y (t) follow
dY (t) = rY (t)dt+X(t)dt; (0 < t < ) Y (0) = y; (2)
where y( 0) is a constant representing the initial cash reserves. Note that Y (t) is an
increasing process.
Boyle and Guthrie (2003) assume the dynamics of cash reserves exogenously and con-
sider an option to initiate a new project. In contrast, we relate cash reserves Y (t) to
operating cash ows X(t) more directly and consider the option to expand production.
In the case of C = 0, the setup corresponds to an alternative investment model studied
in Dixit (1993) and Decamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006). For a comprehensive list
of typical situations tting the standard model, refer to Dixit (1993), Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), and Decamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006). We extend the standard model,
which presumes that the rm needs no costs of external nancing (otherwise, it has suf-
cient internal funds), to a model involving costs of external nancing. Unlike Boyle and
Guthrie (2003), who focused on a liquidity constraint in xed-size investment, we examine
the interactions of investment timing, size, and nancing costs.3
Our assumption of costly external nancing is justied as follows. In the pecking order
theory, agency and asymmetric information problems cause costs of external nancing,
3Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010b) extended Boyle and Guthrie (2003) to a case involving both a liquidity
constraint and nancing costs. Nishihara and Shibata (2011) developed a model involving nancing costs,
whereas Shibata and Nishihara (2012) focused on a debt issuance constraint. However, these papers assume
xed-scale investment.
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which leads to a preference for internal over external nance (Myers (1984), Myers and
Majluf (1984)). Practically, nancing costs consist of a xed cost (which is independent of
the issue size) and a variable cost (which depends on the issue size). A xed cost includes
taxes, fees, and setup expenses. A variable cost increases with issue size primarily because
more underwriting services are required for more funds raised. In the standard view of
the literature, a variable cost is convex with respect to the issue size (e.g., Altinkilic
and Hansen (2000)). Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimated that proportional costs of
equity nancing are approximately 5% (10%) for large (small) rms. They showed that
a proportional cost can almost completely account for costs of equity nancing for large
rms, although the xed cost eect may be not negligible for small rms. In taking
account of their results, as well as preserving tractability of the model, we examine the
case with only a proportional cost in full detail in Sections 3 and 4.1, and succinctly
explain how the results change in the case involving both xed and proportional costs as
a supplement in Section 4.2.
2.2 Case with no nancing costs
As a benchmark, this section explains results in the case of C = 0. In this case, the rm
solves the following problem:
sup
2T
Ex[max
i=1;2
E;X()[
Z 
0
e rtX(t)dt+
Z 1

e rtAiX(t)dt  e rIi]]; (3)
where T denotes the set of all stopping times and Ex[] (E;X()[]) denotes the expectation
conditional on t = 0; X(0) = x (t = ;X(t) = X()). In (3),  represents the time to
expand the scale of production, whereas maxi=1;2 E;X()[] represents the sizing choice at
time  . By the strong Markov property of X(t), (3) can be reduced to
x
r    + sup2T E
x[e r max
i=1;2

Ai   1
r    X()  Ii

]| {z }
=:V0(x) the growth option value
:
The second term, denoted by V0(x), represents the growth option value. Decamps, Mar-
iotti, and Villeneuve (2006) derived a closed-form solution for this type of problem.4
Indeed, we have V0(x) depending on the relation of A1; A2; I1 and I2 as follows:
4For this type of problem, refer also to Nishihara and Ohyama (2008).
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If f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < I2=I1,
V0(x) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:

(A1   1)x1
r      I1

x
x1

(0 < x < x1) waiting
(A1   1)x
r      I1 (x

1  x  x21) small-scale expansion
(A1   1)x2 1   (A2   1)x1 1
(r   )(x1 1x2 1   x1 1x2 1)
x
+
(A1   1)x2 1   (A2   1)x1 1
(r   )(x1 1x2 1   x1 1x2 1)
x (x21  x  x22) waiting
(A2   1)x
r      I2 (x  x

22) large-scale expansion;
(4)
where  := 1=2 =2 +p(=2   1=2)2 + 2r=2 (> 1) and  := 1=2 =2  p(=2   1=2)2 + 2r=2
(< 0) is positive and negative characteristic roots, respectively. Threshold x1 is dened
by x1 := (r   )I1=f(A1   1)(   1)g, which is equal to the threshold for an option
to invest only in the small-scale project. On the other hand, thresholds x21 and x22 are
determined by the value matching (continuous t) conditions at the boundaries.
If f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1)  I2=I1,
V0(x) =
8>>><>>>:

(A2   1)x2
r      I2

x
x2

(0 < x < x2) waiting
(A2   1)x
r      I2 (x  x

2) large-scale expansion;
(5)
where x2 := (r   )I2=f(A2   1)(   1)g. In this case, the problem is reduced to a
problem of investing only in the large-scale project because the value (5) dominates the
value of the small-scale investment, (A1   1)x=(r   )  I1, for all x > 0.
Note that =(   1) monotonically increases with  because of @=@ < 0. A higher
 is more likely to lead to the case of f(A2 1)=(A1 1)g=( 1)  I2=I1. The intuition is
that a higher  increases the value of the large-scale growth option so that the value (5)
can dominate (A1 1)x=(r )  I1 for all x > 0. For details, refer to Decamps, Mariotti,
and Villeneuve (2006). We also note that
V0(x)  max
i=1;2

sup
2T
Ex[e r

Ai   1
r    X()  Ii

]

| {z }
the value by the initial sizing choice
; (6)
where in the left-hand side the sizing decision i 2 f1; 2g is F -measurable, while in the
right-hand side i 2 f1; 2g is F0-measurable. Dixit (1993) focused only on the right-hand
problem, and Decamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) complemented his argument by
solving the left-hand problem. Because of the dierence, in general we have the inequality
(6). However, the equality
V0(x) = max
i=1;2

sup
2T
Ex[e r

Ai   1
r    X()  Ii

]

; (7)
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holds for x  x1. This means that, if the initial value X(0) = x is suciently low, this
problem is unchanged from the case in which the rm chooses the investment size not
dynamically but at the initial time.
3 Analytic Results
3.1 Model solutions
This section provides analytic results in the case of C > 0. In this case, the growth option
value, denoted by VC(x; y), is expressed as
VC(x; y) = sup
2T
Ex;y[e r max
i=1;2

Ai   1
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(Ii   Y (); 0)

]; (8)
where where Ex;y[] denotes the expectation conditional on t = 0; X(0) = x; Y (0) = y.
The term Cmax(Ii   Y (); 0) represents that a proportional cost is required when the
rm is short of cash reserves, whereas maxi=1;2() means that the rm chooses the optimal
size at the investment time  .
First, we prove several properties of the option value VC(x; y). Consider the following
problems as approximations of VC(x; y):
VL(x; y) := sup
2T
Ex[e r max
i=1;2

Ai   1
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(Ii   y; 0)

];
VU (x; y) := sup
2T
Ex;y[e r max
i=1;2

Ai   1
r    X()  Ii   C(Ii   Y ())

]:
VL(x; y) is the same type of problem as V0(x) so that it allows an explicit solution like (4)
or (5). By the strong Markov property of X(t), we can easily show
VU (x; y) = C

y +
x
r   

+ sup
2T
Ex;y[e r max
i=1;2

Ai   C   1
r    X()  (1 + C)Ii

]:
If A2   C   1 > 0, we have an explicit solution like (4) or (5). Otherwise, VU (x; y) =
C(y + x=(r   )) holds, which means that the growth option will be never exercised.
Note that in both VL(x; y) and VU (x; y) the exercise policies are independent of Y (t).
The following proposition indicates that VL(x; y) and VU (x; y) are closed-form bounds of
VC(x; y).
Proposition 1 (Option value)
If y < I2, VL(x; y)  VC(x; y)  VU (x; y) is satised.
Otherwise, VC(x; y) = V0(x) holds.
Proposition 1 states that, once Y (t) reaches the large-scale investment cost I2, the problem
with nancing costs is reduced to that of no nancing cost. We will also use the following
lemma to show the properties of the optimal nancing and investment policy.
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Lemma 1
If A2   C   1 > 0,
0  VC(x+; y)  VC(x; y)  (A2   1)
r    (9)
holds for any positive constant .
0  VC(x; y +)  VC(x; y)  C (10)
holds for any positive constant .
Next, we concentrate on the exercise regions for the problem (8). The standard argu-
ment proves that the exercise region of the option is expressed as
SC := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j V (x; y) = max
i=1;2
f(Ai   1)x=(r   )  Ii   Cmax(Ii   y; 0)gg: (11)
Furthermore, the exercise region SC can be decomposed into disjoint sets (some may be
empty) dened by
SC;1;E := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j V (x; y) = (A1   1)x=(r   )  I1   C(I1   y); y < I1g;
SC;1;I := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j V (x; y) = (A1   1)x=(r   )  I1; y  I1g;
SC;2;E := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j V (x; y) = (A2   1)x=(r   )  I2   C(I2   y); y < I2g;
SC;2;I := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j V (x; y) = (A2   1)x=(r   )  I2; y  I2g:
The regions SC;1;E and SC;1;I represent small-scale investment regions partially with exter-
nal nancing and entirely with internal nancing, respectively, whereas SC;2;E and SC;2;I
represent large-scale investment regions partially with external nancing and entirely with
internal nancing, respectively. Below, we analytically prove the interesting properties of
SC;1;E , SC;1;I , SC;2;E , and SC;2;I . It immediately follows from Proposition 1 that the ex-
ercise regions coincide with those of V0(x) for y  I2. Note that thresholds x1; x21; x22,
and x2 were explained in Section 2.2.
Proposition 2 (Case of sucient cash reserves)
If f(A2 1)=(A1 1)g=( 1) < I2=I1, SC;1;I\R+[I2;1) = [x1; x21][I2;1) and SC;2;I =
[x22;1) [I2;1) hold. Otherwise, SC;1;I \R+ [I2;1) = ; and SC;2;I = [x2;1) [I2;1)
hold.
Now, we examine the properties of the exercise regions in the region y < I2. In this
region, the optimal policy is contingent on a combination of X(t) and Y (t), and, hence, it
is quite dierent from the threshold policy depending only on X(t) in the region y  I2.
The following proposition reveals the properties of the large-scale investment partially
with external nancing, SC;2;E . Note that the region of the large-scale investment entirely
with internal nancing, SC;2;I , is explicitly derived in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 3 (Large-scale expansion)
If A2   C   1 > 0 is satised,
SC;2;E = f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x  xC(y); y < I2g; (12)
where xC() is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function. xC(y) is between
the corresponding thresholds in VL(x; y) and VU (x; y), and limy"I2 xC(y) is equal to the
maximum of x2 (or x22) and (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1).
Otherwise, SC;2;E = ;.
Here we limit our attention to a case in which a proportional cost is relatively low, i.e.,
A2 C 1 > 0. We will explain the case of A2 C 1  0 below Proposition 6. In the case
of A2   C   1 > 0, the rm invests in the large-scale investment partially with external
nancing when the output price X(t) exceeds the threshold xC(Y (t)). Proposition 3
ensures monotonicity in the lager-scale investment threshold xC(Y (t)) with respect to
cash reserves Y (t). This monotonicity can be straightforwardly explained as follows. An
increase in Y (t) decreases a nancing cost C(I   Y (t)), which accelerates the large-scale
investment.
We now examine the properties of the small-scale investment regions, SC;1;E and SC;1;I .
Proposition 4 suggests the possibility that SC;1;E and SC;1;I are generated by costs of
external nancing. Proposition 5 describes the properties of SC;1;E and SC;1;I on the
presumption that they exist.
Proposition 4 (Possibility of the small-scale expansion)
If f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < I2=I1, SC;1;E may not be empty and SC;1;I 6= ;.
If I2=I1  f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < fI2 + C(I2   I1)g=I1, SC;1;E and SC;1;I may not
be empty.
Otherwise, SC;1;E = SC;1;I = ;.
Proposition 5 (Small-scale expansion)
If (x; y) 2 SC;1;E , (x; I1) 2 SC;1;I and (x; y0) 2 SC;1;E holds for any y0 2 [y; I1).
If (x; y) 2 SC;1;I , (x; y0) 2 SC;1;I holds for any y0 2 [I1; y].
If f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < I2=I1, minfx  0 j (x; y) 2 SC;1;Ig = x1 holds for any
xed y  I1.
Proposition 5 shows that the small-scale investment region enhances with cash reserves
Y (t) until Y (t) = I1 and from the point it decreases with Y (t). This non-monotonic
property is in sharp contrast with the monotonicity of the large-scale investment region
proved in Proposition 3. Below, we explain the interesting result in terms of the investment
sizing choice changing with Y (t).
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
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Figure 1 illustrates how the ratio of the total cost associated with the large-scale ex-
pansion to that of the small-scale expansion, fI2+Cmax(I2 Y (t); 0)g=fI1+Cmax(I1 
Y (t); 0)g, changes with Y (t). Note that the ratio regarding the prot expansion, (A2  
1)=(A1   1), is independent of Y (t). The ratio is equal to I2=I1 for Y (t) = 0 because ex-
ternal funds cover entire investment costs in both projects. For Y (t) 2 (0; I1], the internal
funds cover Y (t) out of I1 and I2 in the small- and large-scale projects, respectively. The
coverage ratio in the small-scale project, Y (t)=I1, increases more with Y (t) than that of the
large-scale project. Then, the ratio fI2+Cmax(I2 Y (t); 0)g=fI1+Cmax(I1 Y (t); 0)g
monotonically increases up to the maximum level fI2 + C(I2   I1)g=I1 for Y (t) = I1.
This increase leads to the result that a higher Y (t) encourages the rm to invest in the
small-scale project until Y (t) = I1. For Y (t) 2 [I1; I2), the small-scale project requires
no external nancing, while the large-scale project requires the external funds I2   Y (t).
An increase in Y (t) decreases the total cost associated with the large-scale investment,
preserving the small-scale investment cost unchanged. Then, the ratio fI2 + Cmax(I2  
Y (t); 0)g=fI1 + Cmax(I1   Y (t); 0)g monotonically falls to the minimum level I2=I1 for
Y (t) = I2. This decrease leads to the novel result that a higher Y (t) discourages the rm
to invest in the small-scale project within the region Y (t) 2 [I1; I2].
As explained by the mechanism above, the possibility of the small-scale expansion
is maximized at the point Y (t) = I1. Proposition 4 states that, if the maximum ratio
fI2+C(I2  I1)g=I1 is smaller than the critical level f(A2  1)=(A1  1)g=( 1), the rm
never undertakes the small-scale investment. Now, compare this result with that of the
case with no nancing costs. In the absence of nancing costs, the rm never undertakes
the small-scale investment if I2=I1 < f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) is satised (see Section
2.2). In the presence of nancing costs, on the other hand, the rm has a possibility of
investing in the small-scale project in the region I2=I1  f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) <
fI2 + C(I2   I1)g=I1. This demonstrates that costs of external nancing can trigger the
small-scale investment which is never undertaken in the case with no nancing costs. This
also suggests the counter-intuitive eect that nancing costs may speed up investment (but
it is small-scale).
We can prove the following proposition regarding the possibility of external nancing.
Proposition 6 (Possibility of external nancing)
If C < A1   1, SC;1;E may not be empty and SC;2;E 6= ;.
If A1   1  C < A2   1, SC;1;E = ; and SC;2;E 6= ;.
Otherwise, SC;1;E = SC;2;E = ;.
It is clear that high nancing costs prevent a rm from nancing the project with ex-
ternal funds. Further, and more interestingly, this proposition suggests that the rm is
more likely to rely on external funds in the large-scale expansion than in the small-scale
expansion. To see this, suppose that the cost of external nancing is intermediate, i.e.,
A1   1  C < A2   1. In this case, the small-scale project is always deferred until the
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project can be nanced entirely with internal funds. On the other hand, the large-scale
project is undertaken partially with external nancing when X(t) reaches a suciently
high level. The reasoning is as follows. In the region Y (t) < I1, the rm receives cost
savings of CX(t)dt+ r(1 + C)I1dt and loses (A1   1)X(t)dt by deferring the small-scale
investment by an innitesimally short period dt. Then, the rm never nances the small-
scale project with external funds for any X(t) if C  A1 1 is satised. In the case of the
large-scale project, the positive eect CX(t)dt remains unchanged,5 while the negative
eect is enlarged to (A2  1)X(t)dt. This increases the rm's incentive to access external
nancing in the large-scale expansion.
3.2 Empirical implications
In this subsection, we provide empirical implications obtained from the propositions in
Section 3.1 and clarify our contributions to the literature.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 summarizes the properties of the nancing and investment policy in Propo-
sitions 3{6.6 The rst, second, and third rows correspond to the cases with high, inter-
mediate, and low cost of external nancing, respectively. The rst, second, and third
columns correspond to the cases with high, intermediate, and low values of I2=I1 (or
(A1   1)=(A2   1)). In the hatched regions the rm invests entirely with internal nanc-
ing, while in the other regions it relies partially on external nancing. The gure also
indicates the investment size the rm chooses in the exercise region.
When I2=I1 (or (A1 1)=(A2 1)) is suciently low, i.e., in the rst column, the nanc-
ing and investment policy is the same as that of the case with only the large-scale project
(xed-scale investment model). This case is studied in details by Nishihara and Shibata
(2011), and, hence, we omit the explanation. The second and third columns present more
interesting panels, in which the rm optimizes the investment size as well as investment
timing. The panels show that costs of external nancing bring many dierences from the
case with no nancing constraint in Section 2.2 (refer also to Decamps, Mariotti, and
Villeneuve (2006)). Among all, a key dierence is regarding the necessity of dynamically
deciding the investment size. Except for Panel (ix) the rm cannot determine the invest-
ment size at the initial time even if the initial value X(0) = x is low. The rm invests in
either the small- or large-scale project depending on the dynamics of (X(t); Y (t)). Recall
5The term r(1 + C)I2dt is negligible when X(t) is high.
6In all gures in this paper, we set the axes in the same way as Boyle and Guthrie (2003), Hirth and Uhrig-
Homburg (2010b), and Nishihara and Shibata (2011) for comparison. This gure illustrates the cases in which
x2 (or x

22) in problem V0(x) is larger than (C +1)rI2=(A2 C   1) in Proposition 3. Otherwise, there is a gap
between limy"I2 x

C(y) and x

2 (or x

22) for Y (t) = I2. The characteristics remain unchanged except for the gap
at the point Y (t) = I2.
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that in Section 2.2 the dynamic choice is not necessary for a suciently low X(0) = x.
Our results complement Dixit (1993) and Decamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) by
revealing the signicance of the rm's dynamic sizing choice in the presence of costs of
external nancing.
Next, we clarify a signicant contribution to the corporate nance literature. In cor-
porate nance, there have been long-term arguments about sensitivities of investment to
cash ow since seminal works by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Kaplan and
Zingales (1997), and Hubbard (1998). Recently, several empirical studies regarding this
issue have demonstrated a counter-intuitive result that the investment volume does not
necessarily decrease with a degree of nancing constraints. Specically, Cleary, Povel, and
Raith (2007) and Guariglia (2008) documented a U-shaped relation between the invest-
ment volume and internal funds. This suggests that an intermediate level of nancing
constraint can lead to underinvestment.
On the other hand, a recent stream of real options literature has provided another pre-
diction: an intermediate level of nancing constraint can lead a rm to hasten investment.
Boyle and Guthrie (2003) showed that the investment threshold has a U-shaped relation
with a degree of a liquidity constraint because of a rm's incentive to avoid the risk of
a cash shortfall. Shibata and Nishihara (2012) showed that a rm's consideration of the
optimal capital structure leads to a U-shaped relation between the investment threshold
and a debt capacity constraint. If \hastened" investment is equal to \increased" invest-
ment, the prediction from the real options literature is contrary to the empirical evidence.
However, this argument is not precise because the investment timing studies consider
xed-scale investment models. Indeed, by integrating both investment timing and sizing
problems, we can demonstrate that the two results do not conict but complement each
other.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
To see this clearly, we concentrate on the most interesting case, Panel (viii) (or (v))
in Figure 2.7 Figure 3 illustrates the minimum threshold price in which the rm invests
and the project that is chosen at the threshold in this case. This gure indicates that
the rm with low or high cash reserves undertakes the large-scale project on the later
timing, while, with intermediate cash reserves (Y (t)  I1), it invests in the small-scale
project on the earlier timing. An intermediate level of cash holdings can play both roles
in accelerating the investment time and decreasing the investment size. In the presence
of the cost of external nancing, as explained with Figure 1, an intermediate level of
cash reserves provides the greatest incentive for the rm to undertake the small-scale
expansion rather than the large-scale expansion. Then, from the viewpoint of investment
7In other cases, our model can also explain the conventional results, i.e., the monotonic relations regarding
the investment volume and timing. In the real options literature, Milne and Robertson (1996), Nishihara and
Shibata (2010), and Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010a) are in line with the monotonicity.
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size, the investment is scaled down from the rst-best level of a case with no nancing
cost. At the same time, from the viewpoint of investment timing, the investment takes
place earlier than the rst-best timing because the small-scale investment has a lower
value of the deferring option than that of the large-scale investment. Unlike Boyle and
Guthrie (2003) and Shibata and Nishihara (2012), by the interaction of nancing costs,
investment timing, and investment size, we can explain both non-monotonic relations
regarding the investment volume and timing. This mechanism lls the gap between the
investment volume and timing literature.
Lastly, we explain a contribution to the literature from a technical viewpoint. This
paper, unlike most of the related papers relying on numerical simulations, attains analytic
results. Although some of the techniques used in the proof are inspired by the mathemati-
cal nance literature (e.g., Broadie and Detemple (1997), Detemple (2006), Bobtche and
Villeneuve (2010)), several developments are attained by this paper.8 While the mathe-
matical nance studies investigated the exercise regions of American options that involve
a multi-dimensional geometric Brownian motion, the stochastic process Y (t) in our model
is not a geometric Brownian motion; instead, it is dened by (2). Furthermore, the pay-
o function of problem (8) is not convex, which makes the proofs more dicult. These
technical developments can be potentially applied to a variety of investment timing and
sizing problems.
4 Numerical examples
As mentioned in Section 1, the main contribution of this paper is to attain analytic results
regarding the rm's optimal nancing and investment policy in Section 3. We supplement
the results from two aspects in numerical examples. Section 4.1 presents the comparative
statics results with respect to the output price volatility . Section 4.2 we present the
results in a case with a xed cost in addition to a proportional cost of external nancing.
4.1 Base case
We explore the eects of output price uncertainty to the nancing and investment policy.
The base parameter values are set as follows:
r = 0:07;  = 0:03;  = 0:2; I1 = 50; I2 = 100; A1 = 1:385; A2 = 1:5; C = 0:1: (13)
For comparison, we set the parameter values for the large-scale expansion at the same
values as Nishihara and Shibata (2011). These parameter values are also similar to those
of the standard real options literature.
8Nishihara and Shibata (2011) developed similar techniques to prove the properties of the optimal nancing
and investment policy in the presence of a proportional cost of external nancing, but they assumed a xed
investment size.
14
For the base parameter values (13), we have f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) = 1:9569 <
I2=I1 = 2 regarding the possibility of the small-scale expansion (Proposition 4). This
means that the rm may undertake the small-scale investment. We also have C = 0:1 <
A1 1 = 0:285 regarding the possibility of external nancing (Proposition 6). This means
that the projects may be nanced partially with external nancing. In the computation,
we make a tri-nomial lattice model that approximates to a geometric Brownian motion
(1), and we use a value function iteration algorithm.
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 plots the exercise regions with varying levels of . We can see from Figure 4
that a higher  decreases the exercise regions, which implies that the investment threshold
and the option value enhance with . This volatility eect is straightforwardly consistent
with the standard results with neither nancing costs nor sizing choice.
Further and more notably, Figure 4 demonstrates that the volatility eect is stronger
for the small-scale investment than for the large-scale investment. As  increases up
to 0:2, the region of the small-scale investment partially with external nancing, SC;1;E ,
disappears rst. As  increases up to 0:25, the region of the small-scale investment entirely
with internal nancing, SC;1;I , disappears either. Then, for  = 0:25 and 0:3, the nancing
and investment policy is the same as that of a case in which the investment size is xed
at the large scale. The rationale is based on Proposition 4. Indeed, we have f(A2  
1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < I2=I1 for  = 0:1; 0:15; 0:2, I2=I1  f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) <
fI2+C(I2  I1)g=I1 for  = 0:213, and fI2+C(I2  I1)g=I1  f(A2 1)=(A1 1)g=( 1)
for  = 0:25; 0:3. Note that =(   1) monotonically increases with . As a result, the
nancing and investment policy becomes like panel (ix)! panel (vi)! panel (v)! panel
(iv) in Figure 2 with an increase in . A higher , like a higher I2=I1 or (A1 1)=(A2 1),
increases the advantage of the large-scale expansion over the small-scale expansion. It
should be also noted that the panel of  = 0:213 corresponds to the most interesting case,
panel (v) in Figure 2 (or Figure 3).
4.2 Extension to a case with xed and proportional costs
So far we have concentrated on a proportional cost of external nancing because a propor-
tional cost accounts for the greatest part of nancing (e.g., Hennessy and Whited (2007)).
However, according to Hennessy and Whited (2007), the eects of a xed cost may be
observable for small rms. To check the robustness, we present a case with both xed
and proportional costs of external nancing.
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 illustrates the exercise regions in the extended case with varying levels of . In
the numerical examples, the xed cost is set at 1. This means that the total nancing cost
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is equal to 0:1max(Ii   Y (t); 0) + 1fIi Y (t)>0g, where 1fg denotes the indicator function.
For Y (t) " Ii, a xed cost provides the greatest incentive for the rm to wait and invest
entirely with internal funds. Then, the rm never invests when Y (t) reach nearly I1 =
50 or I2 = 100, which leads to disconnected exercise regions. This xed cost eect is
documented in Nishihara and Shibata (2011) who examined the xed cost eects in a
xed-scale investment model. Furthermore, we can see from Figure 5 that the xed cost
eect is strong particularly in the small-scale project. Indeed, compared to Figure 4,
Figure 5 has no small-scale investment region partially with external nancing, SC;1;E ,
at all. The presence of a xed cost removes the possibility of investing in the small-
scale project partially with external nancing. Figure 5 inherits the other characteristics
from Figure 4. Most notably, the panel of  = 0:213 still holds an island-like small-scale
investment region even if a xed cost is considered.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the interactions of nancing costs, investment timing, and invest-
ment sizing in a dynamic model. We assumed that a rm can invest in either a small-
or large-scale project with cash reserves, which are increasing with time, and external
funds that require a proportional cost. We, unlike most of the related papers, analytically
proved the properties of the corporate nancing and investment policy. The results are
summarized as follows.
Financing costs lead to the nancing and investment policy strongly contingent on the
dynamics of both the cash ow and reserves. In particular, in the presence of nancing
costs, the rm is more likely to invest in the small-scale project entirely using internal
funds. The investment threshold for the large-scale project monotonically decreases with
cash reserves, while the investment region for the small-scale project has a non-monotonic
relation with cash reserves. Most notably, an intermediate level of cash reserves can play
both roles in speeding up the investment and in decreasing the investment size. Our
results can explain two types of results in corporate nance: (i) empirical ndings that
the investment volume has a U-shaped relation with internal funds, and (ii) empirical
predictions that the investment threshold has a U-shaped relation with internal funds.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Since Y (t) monotonically increases from the initial value y, we have
Ii   Y (t)  max(Ii   Y (t); 0)  max(Ii   y; 0) (i = 1; 2)
at any time t. This implies that VL(x; y)  VC(x; y)  VU (x; y) holds. The problem (8)
can be reduced to the problem with no nancing cost when y  I2.
B Proof of Lemma 1
First, we prove (9). Note that E1[] represents the expectation with X(t) starting from
X(0) = 1. For any positive constant , we have
VC(x+; y)
= sup
2T
E1[e r max
i=1;2

(Ai   1)(x+)
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(Ii   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)(x+)X(s)ds; 0)

]
 sup
2T
E1[e r

max
i=1;2

(Ai   1)x
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(Ii   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)xX(s)ds; 0)

+
(A2   1)
r    X() + C
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds

] (14)
 sup
2T
E1[e r max
i=1;2

(Ai   1)x
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(I   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)xX(s)ds; 0)

]| {z }
=VC(x;y)
+ sup
2T
E1[e r

(A2   1)
r    X() + C
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds

]
=VC(x; y) + sup
2T
E1[e r

(A2   1)
r    X()

+ C
Z 1
0
e rsX(s)ds 
Z 1

e rsX(s)ds

]
=VC(x; y) +
C
r    +
(A2   1  C)
r    sup2T E
1[e rX()]| {z }
=1
(15)
=VC(x; y) +
(A2   1)
r    ;
where (14) follows from A1 < A2, and in (15) sup2T E1[e rX()] = 1 follows from
 < r.
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Next, we prove (10). For any positive constant , we have
VC(x; y +)
= sup
2T
Ex[e r max
i=1;2

(Ai   1)
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(Ii   e
r (y + 
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds; 0)

]
 sup
2T
Ex[e r

max
i=1;2

(Ai   1)
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(Ii   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds; 0)

+ erC

]
= sup
2T
Ex[e r max
i=1;2

(Ai   1)
r    X()  Ii   Cmax(Ii   e
ry  
Z 
0
er( s)X(s)ds; 0)

]| {z }
=VC(x;y)
+C
=VC(x; y) + C:
C Proof of Proposition 2
Note that Y (t) monotonically increases from the initial value y. Once Y (t) reached I2,
VC(x; y) can be reduced to V0(x; y). Then, the exercise region agrees with the exercise
region for the benchmark problem V0(x; y) which is explicitly obtained in Section 2.2.
D Proof of Proposition 3
First, consider the case of A2 C 1 > 0. Fix (x; y) 2 SC;2;E and (x0; y0) satisfying x  x0
and y  y0 < I2. Using Lemma 1, we have
VC(x
0; y0) = VC(x0; y0)  VC(x; y0) + VC(x; y0)  VC(x; y) + VC(x; y)
 (A2   1)(x
0   x)
r    + C(y
0   y) + VC(x; y)
=
(A2   1)(x0   x)
r    + C(y
0   y) + (A2   1)x
r      I2   C(I2   y)
=
(A2   1)x0
r      I2   C(I2   y
0);
where the last inequality implies (x0; y0) 2 SC;2;E . This proves that SC;2;E is expressed as
(12) with the decreasing function xC(). By Proposition 1, we can immediately show that
xC(y) is between the corresponding thresholds in VL(x; y) and VU (x; y).
Next, we derive limy"I2 xC(y). Clearly we have limy"I2 x

C(y)  x2. Here we explain
the case of f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1)  I2=I1. Replace x2 with x22 in the case of
f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < I2=I1. Denote
f2(x; y) :=
(A2   1)x
r      I2   C(I2   y): (16)
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We have
Lf2(x; y)  rf2(x; y)  0
,(A2   1)x
r    + C(x+ ry)  r

(A2   1)x
r      I2   C(I2   y)

 0
,x  (C + 1)rI2
A2   C   1 ; (17)
where L denotes the generating operator of (X(t); Y (t)), i.e.,
L := x @
@x
+
1
2
2x2
@2
@x2
+ (x+ ry)
@
@y
: (18)
Since the general theory of optimal stopping ensures LVC(x; y)   rVC(x; y)  0 (refer
to Peskir and Shiryaev (2006)), (17) implies that f2(x; y) is not equal to VC(x; y) for
x < (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1) and y < I2. In other words, the option is not exercised
in the region f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x < (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1); y < I2g. This proves that
limy"I2 xC(y)  (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1).
[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
Now, suppose that (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1)  x2 < limy"I2 xC(y). See Figure 6. We
can lead to contradiction as follows. Consider problem
sup
2T ;T
Ex;y[e rf2(X(); Y ())] (19)
with a nite maturity T . Generally, the exercise region of an American option converges
to the region Lf2   rf2  0, when the remaining life of the option goes to zero (refer
to Detemple (2006)). Then, because of (17), the exercise region of problem (19) with a
nite maturity T converges to f(x; y) 2 R2+ j x  (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1)g when T # 0.
Consider the exercise region of problem (8) for a xed x satisfying x2 < x < limy"I2 xC(y)
and y " I2. Note that infft  0 j X(t)  x2; Y (t)  I2g converges to 0 as y " I2.
Accordingly, the exercise region of the problem (8) for the xed x and y " I2 converges to
that of problem (19) with T # 0. This implies that limy"I2 xC(y) = (C+1)rI2=(A2 C 1),
which contradicts the assumption of (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1) < limy"I2 xC(y). Similarly
we can lead to contradiction if x2 < (C +1)rI2=(A2 C   1) < limy"I2 xC(y) is supposed.
Thus, we have limy"I2 xC(y) = max(x

2; (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1)).
We can show the continuity of xC() as follows. By Lemma 1 we have the continuity of
VC(x; y). Since VC(x; y) and (A2   1)x=r     I2 Cmax(I2 y; 0) are both continuous,
SC;2;E [ SC;2;I is a closed set. Consider any xed y(< I2). Then, we have lim#0(xC(y +
); y + ) 2 SC;2;E , which leads to lim#0 xC(y + )  xC(y). We have lim#0 xC(y + ) 
xC(y) because x

C() is a decreasing function. Thus, we obtain the right-continuity of
xC(). Now, suppose that there exists y(< I2) satisfying xC(y) < lim#0 xC(y ). We can
lead to contradiction as the same method as the proof of limy"I2 xC(y) = max(x

2; (C +
1)rI2=(A2  C   1)). Consider the exercise region of problem (19) for a xed x satisfying
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xC(y) < x < lim#0 x

C(y   ) and y   . Note that infft  0 j X(t)  xC(Y (t))g
converges to 0 as  # 0. Then, the exercise region converges to that of problem (19)
with T # 0. This implies lim#0 xC(y   ) = (C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1), which contradicts
(C + 1)rI2=(A2   C   1)  xC(y) < lim#0 xC(y   ). Thus, we obtain the left-continuity
of xC().
Lastly, consider the case of A2   C   1  0. In this case, we have for any (x; y) 2 R2+
Lf2(x; y)  rf2(x; y) =  (A2   C   1)x+ (C + 1)rI2 > 0;
where L is the generating operator dened by (18) and f2(x; y) is dened by (16). Since
LVC(x; y)   rVC(x; y)  0 follows from the general theory of optimal stopping, f2(x; y)
does not agree with VC(x; y). This implies SC;2;E = ;. The proof is completed.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Note that VC(x; y) can be reduced to V0(x; y) for y  I2. In the case of f(A2   1)=(A1  
1)g=( 1) < I2=I1, the problem V0(x; y) has the small-scale expansion region [x1; x21]
(recall Section 2.2). Then, we have [x1; x21] [I2;1)  SC;1;I , which implies that SC;1;I 6=
;.
Next, consider the case of f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1)  (I2 + C(I2   I1))=I1. By
Proposition 1, we have VC(x; y)  VL(x; y). Since we have
A2   1
A1   1
 
 1
 I2 + C(I2   I1)
I1
 I2 + Cmax(I2   y; 0)
I1 + Cmax(I1   y; 0)
for any y, the problem VL(x; y) has no small-scale expansion region (cf. Section 2.2). This
implies that
VL(x; y) >
(A1   1)x
r      I1   Cmax(I1   y; 0): (20)
By (20) and VC(x; y)  VL(x; y), we have SC;1;E = SC;1;I = ;.
Note that, in the case of I2=I1  f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < (I2 + C(I2   I1))=I1,
We have no clear results, but, as seen in the argument above, SC;1;E and SC;1;I may exist
within the region 0  y < I2.
F Proof of Proposition 5
Take any (x; y) 2 SC;1;E and y0 2 [y; I1). By (10) in Lemma 1, we have
VC(x; y
0)  VC(x; y) + C(y0   y)
=
(A1   1)x
r      I1   C(I1   y) + C(y
0   y)
=
(A1   1)x
r      I1   C(I1   y
0);
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where the last inequality implies (x; y) 2 SC;1;E . Similarly, we have
VC(x; I1)  (A1   1)x
r      I1;
which means (x; I1) 2 SC;1;I .
Next, consider any (x; y) 2 SC;1;I and y0 2 [I1; y). We have
VC(x; y
0)  VC(x; y)
=
(A1   1)x
r      I1;
where the last inequality implies (x; y) 2 SC;1;I .
Lastly, we focus on the case of f(A2   1)=(A1   1)g=( 1) < I2=I1. In this case, it
follows from (4) that
VC(x; y)  V0(x)
=

(A1   1)x1
r      I1

x
x1

; (21)
for x < x1. Consider the problem VC(x; y) with a initial point (X(0); Y (0)) = (x; y)
satisfying x < x1 and y  I1. For the problem, we can realize the right-hand side of (21)
by the stopping time infft  0 j X(t)  x1g. Then, this threshold policy infft  0 j
X(t)  x1g is optimal. In other words, minfx  0 j (x; y) 2 SC;1;Ig = x1 holds for any
xed y  I1.
G Proof of Proposition 6
We have already proved the properties of SC;2;E in Proposition 3, and, hence, we focus
on the properties of SC;1;E below. In the same manner as the proof of Proposition 3, we
can show the properties. Dene
f1(x; y) :=
(A1   1)x
r      I1   C(I1   y);
and consider the case of C  A1   1. We have for any (x; y) 2 R2+
Lf1(x; y)  rf1(x; y) =  (A1   C   1)x+ (C + 1)rI1 > 0;
where L is the generating operator dened by (18). Since LVC(x; y)   rVC(x; y)  0
follows from the general theory of optimal stopping, f1(x; y) does not agree with VC(x; y)
for any (x; y) 2 R2+. This implies that SC;1;E = ;. The proof is completed.
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Figure 1: The ratio fI2+Cmax(I2 Y (t); 0)g=fI1+Cmax(I1 Y (t); 0)g. The ratio is unimodal
and has the maximum value fI2 + C(I2   I1)g=I1 for Y (t) = I1.
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Figure 2: The exercise regions SC;1;E, SC;1;I , SC;2;E, and SC;2;I . This gure summarizes the
properties proved in Propositions 3{6. The rst, second, and third rows correspond to the cases
with high, intermediate, and low cost of external nancing, respectively. The rst, second, and
third columns correspond to the cases with high, intermediate, and low values of I2=I1 (or
(A1   1)=(A2   1)). The hatched regions correspond to the entirely internal nancing regions,
SC;1;I and SC;2;I , while the other regions correspond to the partially external nancing regions,
SC;1;E and SC;2;E.
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Figure 3: The minimum output price for which the rm invests. This gure corresponds to
Panel (viii) in Figure 2.
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Figure 4: The comparative statics. The gure plots the exercise regions in the case with a
proportional cost of external nancing with varying levels of . The parameter values other
than  are set at the base case (13).
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Figure 5: The comparative statics. The gure plots the exercise regions in the case with
both xed and proportional costs of external nancing with varying levels of . The xed
cost is set at 1, and the other parameter values are set at the base case (13). Note that
SC;2;E := f(x; y) 2 R2+ j V (x; y) = (A2   1)x=(r   )   I2   C(I2   y)   1; y < I2g because of
the xed cost.
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Figure 6: The assumption of x2 < limy"I2 x

C(y). The dot represents the initial point (x; y)
satisfying x2 < x < limy"I2 x

C(y) and y  I2.
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